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Abstract
In this paper I show that in a parliamentary democracy, contrary to
common wisdom, under a proportional electoral rule governments do not
necessarily represent voters’ preferences better than under plurality rule.
While voters affect the composition of Parliament, decisions are taken by a
subset of Parliamentarians: a coalition of them decides directly and through
the government. As a consequence, two distortions might occur: one at the
electoral stage when Parliament is formed and the other at the coalition
formation stage, when government is chosen. Through a model la Rubin-
stein, I show that small parties’ bargaining power increases when parties
are patient; for sufficiently patient parties, the small (but pivotal) ones ob-
tain a large bargaining power. The distortion introduced by plurality rule
goes in the opposite direction; this can be beneficial (in term of voters’ rep-
resentativeness) as long as the impact of the two distortions is similar. I
show that under non restrictive conditions, plurality rule can outperform
the proportional rule in terms of representativeness of voters’ preferences.
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“Thus there is an inherent conflict between two goals. The ideals of democracy
and equality require as proportional representation as possible while efficient gov-
ernment often requires less proportional representation” (Laakso and Taagepera
(1981), p. 107).
1 Introduction
Electoral systems differ from one other in several aspects. Among them, social sci-
entists might focus on two that are particularly relevant: (1) government efficiency
and (2) representativeness.
By efficiency, I mean the capability to produce well structured and coherent
laws, wasting as few resources as possible. For that, the government needs to be
stable over time and to take fast decisions. Efficiency is beyond the scope of this
work. By representativeness, I mean the measure of the distance between legis-
lator’s and citizens’ objective function. From that perspective, the best electoral
system would attach to a party a power equal its share of voters. Here, I focus
on representativeness, which means that I aim to minimise the difference between
party’s power and share of votes.
Under proportional electoral systems chances are good even for small parties
to be represented in Parliament and to play an active role in the Government.
This induces government instability,1 since decisions must be accepted by a large
number of parties, each having a (possibly different) agenda.2
Electoral systems are certainly the result of a country’s culture. and it might
be hard to define the causal relation between the number of parties in a country
and the type of electoral system. Empirical evidence3 nevertheless shows that
proportional electoral systems tend to produce more fragmented political scenarios,
with many parties represented in Parliament and large governmental coalitions.
This increases the average time needed to produce laws and decreases the average
duration of governments.
On the other hand, common wisdom and supporters of proportional systems4
1See Laakso and Taagepera (1981).
2On top of that, the proportional rule does not incentivise ideologically-close parties to co-
operate. Proportional systems might even incentivise pre-electoral separation of existing parties
into smaller parties, each close to a given group of voters, and to eventually find a post-election
agreement. That way, they might be able to jointly receive more votes than if they were to run
together. Studying that is beyond the scope of this paper.
3See Laakso and Taagepera (1981), Nurmi (1981) and Schofield (1981).
4See, for instance, Douglas (1923).
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argue that voters’ preferences are better represented and thus proportional systems
are more equitable. The aim of this paper is to show that the claim that voters’
preferences are better represented by proportional system is not necessarily true.
In Italy, for instance, from 2006 to 2008 Mr. Prodi led a centre-left government.
Senators from a small pivotal party within the coalition heavily influenced his
activity. This fact highlights the complexity of the link between voters’ preferences
and legislative outcome.
In representative democracies we observe the presence of two filters between
principal (voters) and agent (legislator or government): (1) the electoral system
and (2) the coalition formation process (see figure 1).
Figure 1: The government formation process
Filter 1: the electoral system. Any electoral rule but the proportional
one implies some distortions.5 Several researches have been carried out to study
electoral rules’s distortions.6
Filter 2: forming a coalition. The negotiating power of pivotal agents
implies that, within the winning coalition, power is not shared proportionally to
the percentage of controlled seats.7
5Proportional systems, by definition, do not distort voters’ preferences: Parliament’s compos-
ition perfectly reflects citizens’ vote.
6Besides the well known paper from Taagepera and Shugart (1989),Morelli (2004) and
Kestelman (1999) offer a clear and succinct review of this literature.
7Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Martin and Stevenson (2001), Snyder Jr., Ting, and Ansol-
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A distortion at stage one is beneficial if the two distortions compensate. One
can possibly imagine an infinite number of electoral rules; I restrict my attention
to purely proportional and plurality rule, which are particularly common and from
which most democratic countries derived their own rule.
If, after elections, a single party controls the majority of seats, it rules the
country alone (filter 2 disappears in that case).8 If no party holds a majority, a
party (called ’formateur’) is asked to form the government coalition that will rule
the country.9
The probability for a party of being formateur is unobservable. Baron and
Ferejohn (1989) proposes to attach to the event a probability equal to parties’
share of seats in Parliament; the empirical work of Diermeier and Merlo (2004)
cannot reject this hypothesis. When the formateur is successful, it belongs to
the winning coalition and selects its partners. This approach, common in the
theoretical literature,10 performs well in empirical tests.11
The formateur forms a coalition of parties that, together, received at least
half of the votes cast. Parties in the coalition should come to an agreement on
the political program, the identity of the government’s members and possibly the
share of economic benefits. Together, they rule the country and they derive office
and/or ideological benefits.12
abehere (2005), Kalandrakis (2006) and Bandyopadhyay and Oak (2008) study some properties
of the coalition formation game.
8I disregard this case. In section 3.1 I briefly discuss about that.
9For a detailed explanation of the role of the formateur and how it is chosen see, for instance,
Diermeier and Merlo (2004).
10E.g., see Baron and Diermeier (2001) or Diermeier, Eraslan, and Merlo (2007)
11A widespread alternative, first proposed by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), supposes that
the biggest party is the first formateur. With exogenous probability it does not succeed and it
is replaced by the second biggest party and so on until a party forms a winning coalition. Some
authors, such as Diermeier and Roozendaal (1998), add a cost of delaying government formation
to the model, to increase the probability of succeeding.
12Ideological benefits consist of the right to implement the preferred policy. Office benefits
“could take a variety of forms [...] (including) jobs for party stalwarts, board seats on public
companies [...] (In) Germany; all the major parties [...] occupy seats on the supervisory boards
of the national television system and major corporations (such as Volkswagen). Moreover, each
major party receives substantial amounts of public money for its research and education founda-
tions. Similar arrangements are common in many other parliamentary democracies [...]”(Baron,
Diermeier, and Fong (2007), p.8).
Part of the literature only considers office (Riker (1962), Baron and Ferejohn (1989) or Baron
(1989)) or ideological (Laver and Shepsle (1990), Schofield (1986) or Baron (1993)) benefits.
Austen-Smith and Banks (1990) consider both payoffs, assuming them to be orthogonal, and
analyse them separately. Also in Sened (1996) both elements affect parties, which have ”a utility
function that amalgamates the utility functions used by Ricker and Schofield” (Sened (1996), p.
350). Martin and Stevenson (2001) empirically confirm that both elements might matter.
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The total value of a coalition is given by the sum of both kinds of benefits. It
is shared among members according to their bargaining power. This can happen
within a cooperative or non-cooperative framework.
Cooperative coalition formation theory considers the case in which players max-
imise the total joint profit and then agree to share total benefit according to a rule,
often called value.13 The Shapley value and its modifications (e.g., Shapley-Shubik
and Owen) are the most used rules.14
Non-cooperative game theory formalises a situation in which each player is
maximising his own payoff given the best response of the other players. The
literature on non-cooperative games is usually applied to frameworks in which at
least some players can obtain a higher payoff by adopting selfish strategies.
In the government formation process, like in cooperative games, parties want to
form a coalition (i.e., to enter the government) so as to share the payoff. Belonging
to the coalition is necessary but, once reached the threshold to rule the country,
there is no interest in having a bigger coalition (there is no interest, for instance,
in forming the grand coalition). Moreover it is reasonable to expect that, within
the coalition, all players are playing non-cooperatively.15
I analyse the entire electoral process, from elections to government formation;
I compare purely proportional and plurality rule systems. While the previous
literature (see figure 1) concentrated either on filter one or filter two, the original
contribution and aim of the model is to study under which of the two systems the
distribution of power among parties better reflects citizens’ votes. To do that, for
both electoral systems I compute the misrepresentation of voters’ preferences, i.e.
the Euclidean distance between the expected policy resulting from elections and
voters’ preferences.
I consider the three-party case and assume the number of parties to remain
13A value is a function allocating payoffs in a unique way, for each state of nature, respecting
some required axioms. See Marichal, Kojadinovic, and Fujimoto (2007).
14Shapley-value-like rules assign to each player a power proportional to the expected value
of his marginal contributions to all possible coalitions or, in the case of Shapley-Shubik, of the
number of times a member is pivotal. See Shapley (1953), Owen (1977), Owen (1981), Amer,
Carreras, and Gimenez (2002), van den Brink and van der Laan (2005) and Wiese (2007) for
more details.
15In a preliminary version of this work I solved the coalition formation stage both for the
cooperative and non-cooperative game and introduced a parameter α determining the degree of
cooperation. Results where not changing significantly with either approach, while the description
of the model mixing both became much heavier. Willing to use only one approach, I preferred
the non-cooperative one because standard sharing rules needed to be adapted (I used a modified
version of the Owen value) and this was distracting the reader from the main points of the paper.
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unchanged when the electoral rule changes.16 Each party can, a priori, form a
winning coalition with either of the remaining two.17
The pivotal role of small parties might allow them to obtain more office benefits
than what is justified by their share of votes. Distortive electoral rules tend to
increase the power of the largest parties; if the distortion only compensate for
the previously underlined distortion, distortive electoral rules can increase voters’
representativeness.
Parties discount future; when parties are sufficiently patient, the majority vot-
ing system is preferable regardless of the relative share of seats: the price for the
formateur of convincing other parties to form a coalition increases with patience,
thus the formateur looses bargaining power. Small parties, which are rarely the
formateur, obtain a large share of total benefits. For very impatient parties the
preferred electoral system becomes the proportional one. Parties’ relative share of
seats might also matter in determining which electoral system better represents
voters.
For expositional convenience, I consider that the winning coalition is sharing
a budget and parties, being self-interested, only care about their share of the
budget.18
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes the model and its assump-
tions. Section 3 illustrates results and discusses (subsection 3.1) the consequences
of relaxing some of the initial assumptions. Section 4 illustrates the model using
the Italian data from 2006 Senate and 2008 House of Representatives elections.
The last section concludes.
2 The model
The political process follows (in representative democracies and in my model) the
following chronological scheme:
1. Elections take place
16Having a fixed number of parties can be considered as a short term assumption. I leave for
future researches the study of the long term effects of a change in the electoral rule in the the
n-party.
17In the literature on spatial competition among parties, some authors (e.g. Axelrod (1970)
or de Swaan (1973)) introduce the impossibility for some parties, for a priori ideological reasons,
to form a coalition together. In my model this would not add any extra insight.
18Alternatively, the reader could think a) of different projects to be financed and each party
is interested in only one of them or b) that production of laws is time consuming and parties
should fix the time to devote to each of them to legislate.
5
2. Given the electoral rule, from votes we obtain the share of seats attributed
to each party
3. A randomly chosen formateur tries to form a coalition; negotiation begins
4. A formateur succeeds when a majority coalition is formed and the govern-
ment is chosen. In case of failure, again a formateur is randomly selected
and negotiations start again
5. When a coalition is formed, benefits are shared within its members
I consider a country with n = 3 groups of homogeneous citizens indexed by i.
The relative size of each group is denoted by ci. Without loss of generality, I order
groups by their size, thus c1 > c2 > c3.
For each group, the political program of the corresponding party i maximises
the utility of the group. Vector e regroups the share of seats that parties ob-
tain after the election. An electoral system is seen as a function F transforming
parties’ share of votes into shares of seats, i.e., e = F (c). I focus on two systems:
proportional and majority voting (also called ”plurality rule”).19
Assumption 1 (No standing-alone) No party obtains the majority of seats,
neither under a proportional electoral rule nor under plurality rule. This means
that e1 < 0.5 and, a fortiori, that c1 < 0.5.
Figure 2 shows the possible combinations of e2 and e3 respecting the ordering
0.5 > e1 > e2 > e3 > 0.
Assumption 2 (Constant value of the coalition) I assume that the total amount
of resources to allocate is constant. Consequently, the bargaining issue boils down
to the classical ”sharing a dollar” problem, where each party (and its voters) is
only interested in its share of total budget.
When no party secures a majority, the bargaining phase begins. A coalition S
is the result of an agreement between two parties on how to share the budget. Let
Z denote the set of all feasible allocations (i.e., Z = {z ∈ R3+ :
∑3
1 zi ≤ 1}), zi is
the budget share of party i. A winning coalition has to be supported by at least
19By proportional rule I mean that the share of seats in Parliament is equal to the share of
votes received. By plurality rule I mean that the country is divided in districts (as many as the
number of available seats) and in each district the candidate who receives the largest share of
votes wins.
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Figure 2: Acceptable combinations of e2 and e3.
half of Parliamentarians. Agents’ utility is linear in zi and do not depend on zj
(i.e., Ui(z) = zi). The set D ⊆ 2n = 8 is the set of all possible winning coalitions.
To model the bargaining game, I follow Kalandrakis (2006) which proposes a
game a` la Rubinstein-St˚ahl (Rubinstein (1982)). At time t = 0 a party, called
formateur, is randomly chosen.
Assumption 3 (Recognition probability) The recognition probability pii of be-
ing a successful formateur is equal to the share of seats that party i controls (i.e.,
pii = ei).
The formateur should form a coalition S ⊂ D, which means it has to propose
a vector z which should be approved by the parties in S.20 If z is accepted by S
the game end: the government is formed and the budget is shared according to
z. Otherwise, in the next period (t = 1) a formateur (possibly the same one) is
randomly chosen and the game continues until an agreement is reached. Henceforth
I will use the notation zij to indicate the j
th element of vector z when i is the
formateur.
Assumption 4 All parties discount future at the same rate δ < 1.
Because of the discount factor, the utility in time t of a share zi in period t+ k is
given by Ui(z, t, t + k) = δ
kzi. Before knowing the identity of the formateur, the
20To have a winning coalition, all parties in S should obtain a positive share. There is no
reason to leave a positive share to parties that do not belong to the coalition.
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expected utility of a party depends also on the probability that a given coalition
forms: EUi(z, t, t+ k) = δ
k
∑
h∈D pihz
h
i . Parties’ outside opportunity is zero.
Given the vector of seats share e, the time discount factor δ and the set of
winning coalitions D, a game with 3 parties is denoted by Γ (3, D, δ, e). When an
agent is formateur, its action consists in proposing a division zi ∈ Z of the budget,
the others’ action space consists in the choice to accept or refuse the formateur
proposal. I focus only on stationary proposal strategies involving no delay: in each
period a party always behaves the same way when formateur and, without delay,
all parties belonging to the proposed coalition accept. The continuation value, v,
is defined as the vector of the expected utilities of parties if we move to the next
period.
Party i’s continuation value vi is the expected utility of i if the game moves in
the next period. A no-delay, Stationary, Subgame Perfect, Pure Strategy (SSPPS)
Nash equilibrium for game Γ (3, D, δ, e) is a set zi of stationary strategies, to which
corresponds a vector v of continuation values such that vi =
∑
h∈3 pihz
h
i (with
zi ≥ δvi) for all i ∈ 3.21 Existence of SSP Nash equilibrium is not an issue for game
Γ (3, D, δ, e) by the arguments of Banks and Duggan (2000). SSPPS equilibria in
this game are both Nash and Subgame Perfect. Other equilibria exist, but I only
concentrate on the stable pure strategy ones.22
Measuring misrepresentation. The ultimate goal of the model is to relate
voters’ preferences23 to government policies24. We have all the information to
compute (given voters’ choice) the winning coalition and the relative parties’ share.
So as to determine which electoral system leads to the share of power closer to
voters’ distribution of preferences, I measure misrepresentation throughMy, where
y = {PR;MV } denotes the electoral system, with PR=proportional rule and
MV=majority voting.
21For more details on that, cf. Kalandrakis (2006), p. 444.
22(Snyder Jr., Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005), for the same model, finds one of the mixed
strategies equilibria).
23Voters’ preferences are inferred from their vote. As previously announced, voters are sup-
posed to vote sincerely. Even though it is not always the case, this event is not empirically
irrelevant.
For instance, Hooghe, Maddens, and Noppe (2006) found empirical evidence that after the last
voting rule change in Belgium there were no significant changes in voters’ behaviour and they
interpreted it as a signal of myopic/sincere voting.
24By government policies I mean the amount of resources devoted to each project.
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My =
√√√√∑n
i=1
(∑
S∈N
Pr (S) · zSi − ci
)2
(1)
Pr (S) is the probability for coalition S to be formed and thus of a formateur to be
successful. Note that the electoral system determines the number of seats a party
controls and thus it possibly affects both the probability of a coalition forming and
each party’s budget share.
Equation (1) represents the sum of the Euclidean distances between parties’
expected budget share and the optimal one. This is the square of the difference
between parties’ expected power and their proportion of supporters (ci). Indeed,
equation 1 computes the expected share of benefit (discounted for the probability
of forming each possible coalition) and then it computes the Euclidean distance
between this point and the ideal point where each party’s power is precisely equal
to its share of votes.
Equation (1) takes large values when parties are either under-represented or
over-represented. Over-representation occurs when a party, being pivotal for a co-
alition, obtains a larger share of benefits than the share of population it represents.
To compute My, one needs to know both ci and ei (necessary to compute
Pr {S} · zSi ). The relation between the two variables depends on the electoral sys-
tem. Taagepera and Shugart (1989) show that virtually every electoral system can
be approximated through a function ei = F (ci) =
cτi∑n
j=1 c
τ
j
by properly choosing the
value of the parameter τ . By construction, for the proportional system τ = 1, i.e.
ci = ei. Under plurality rule, the share of seats depends on the geographical distri-
bution of voters’ preferences over districts. For plurality single-member districts
systems, it is usually considered that τ ≈ 3 (Qualter (1968)) and for that was
named the ‘cube rule’.25 According to Taagepera and Shugart (1989), τ = 2.5 is
more appropriated than τ = 3 for modern western societies with plurality single-
member district systems while τ = 8 would be a better approximation for the USA
actual system. In the literature, the original cube rule (with τ = 3) is usually as-
sumed to be a a good approximation for the two party case and also to fit data
for the three party case; when the number of parties increases the precision of this
measure falls.
25This relation was originally formulated by J. P. Smith in a report to the British Royal
Commission on electoral systems in 1909 and then developed and made famous by Duverger
(1954). For a discussion on it and its drawback, see for example Riker (1982), Rogowski and
Kayser (2002) or Blau (2001).
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Since in this model we are only interested in the number of seats each party
obtains, I will not make any assumption on the district distribution of preferences
and I rather assume that the cube rule holds, with τ = 3.26
Assumption 5 (Cube rule) To compute the share of seats of a party under ma-
jority voting given the share of votes received, I assume that we observe the aggreg-
ate number of votes for each party (ci) and the cube rule holds, thus ei =
c3i∑3
j=1 c
3
j
.
3 Model results
I begin with the analysis of how coalitions are formed (I show that it is always
preferable to form a coalition with the smallest other party) and compute the z
vector. Then I compare the misrepresentation of preferences (equation (1)) under
proportional and majoritarian systems, concluding that, for some values of δ, under
proportional voting systems there is a greater distortion of voters’ preferences than
under plurality rule.
With three parties, a coalition of two of them is always sufficient to form a
majority. The formateur chooses the other member of the coalition by comparing
its utility in each possible coalition. Ex ante, 2N = 8 different scenarios might
occur depending on the identity of the formateur.
Proposition 1 (Sharing rule) Denoting i the formateur, it proposes to party j
its continuation value and zero to the other one. In particular, the share vector
zi =
(
zii ; z
i
j; z
i
x
)
takes the following values
(
1− zij; δ1−δei (ejz
j
j + exz
x
j ); 0
)
. Party x
is excluded from the coalition and receives zero, while party j obtains the present
value of what it would get (in discounted expected terms) in the next period.
Proof. There is no reason to form a coalition with more than one other party, since
with three parties any coalition of two of them is sufficient to control the majority
of seats. The cheapest price to induce a party to accept a proposal is to offer its
next period discounted profit. Its expected profit depends on the expected identity
of the formateur in the next period and on which coalition would thus result.
Proposition 2 (Minimal winning coalition) In the SSPPS equilibrium, the
formateur always chooses to form a coalition with the smallest of the two other
26Of course all my results can be replicated with different values of τ to better fit a specific
country electoral system and geographical distribution of preferences among voters. See section
4.1 for more on that.
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parties.27 The ex-ante unique equilibrium scenario is the one in which the follow-
ing coalitions can form: {1,3},{2,3} and {3,2}.28
Proof. In the appendix.
Corollary 2.1 (Probability of forming a coalition) Given the probability of
being the formateur, the probability of forming coalition {i, j} are the following:
Pr({1, 3}) = e1, Pr({2, 3}) = e2 and Pr({3, 2}) = e3.
Corollary 2.2 Equilibrium parties’ shares z are summarised in table 1.
z1 =
(
(1−δ)(1−δe3)
1−δ+δ2e1e3 ; 0;
(1−δe2−δe3)δe3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
)
z2 =
(
0; (1−δ)(1−δe3)
1−δ+δ2e1e3 ;
(1−δe2−δe3)δe3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
)
z3 =
(
0; (1−δ)δe2
1−δ+δ2e1e3 ;
(1−δ)(1−δe2)+δ2e1e3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
)
Table 1: The equilibrium vectors z.
Proposition 2 can be easily interpreted. Small parties are “cheaper to convince
to form a coalition”, thus the formateur always tries to form a coalition with the
smallest available party. From table 1, one can notice that the discount factor δ
plays a key role in the budget share. Since the formateur is residual claimant, it
always pays to its partner its discounted continuation value. The more patient
are the other players, the larger this value. When δ is close to one (parties are
patient), the formateur is forced to let almost all the share to the other party.
This result differs from the one in Snyder Jr., Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005),
which suggests that players’ equilibrium shares are the same, because I concentrate
on the pure strategy equilibrium while Snyder Jr., Ting, and Ansolabehere (2005)
show results from one of the mixed strategies equilibria (with parties competing on
price to belong to the winning coalition, the formateur can extract more surplus
from them and also that prices are the same for all parties).
27This result is in line with the empirical evidence that parties try to form coalition with the
smallest parties and to have minimal winning coalitions.
The reason is clear: it is hard to coordinate a large coalition and government’s efficiency
decreases. Parliamentarians in the coalition try each to influence government’s policy to pursue
their own agenda and coordination costs increase in the size of the coalition. Both theoretical (i.e.,
Gamson (1961), Leiserson (1968) and Riker (1962)) and empirical (i.e., Martin and Stevenson
(2001)) works confirm that the formateur tries to form a minimal winning coalition. In Auriol
and Gary-Bobo (2008) there is a relatively close result: the bigger the size of Parliament (and
similarly of the winning coalition), the more costly it is both to find agreements and to avoid
being (partially) captured or lobbied.
28Which one occurs depends on the identity of the formateur, thus on the share of votes each
party received.
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Figure 3: Coalitional space Z
Figure 3 shows all possible combinations of budget share amongst three parties.
On the axis are parties’ budget shares. The dark side of the simplex is the set
Z. Points A and B are examples of possible budget shares when a coalition forms
between respectively parties 1 and 3 and between 2 and 3. Point C is an example
of where the optimal29 point might be. While point C does not depend on δ, points
A and B do. The larger the value of δ, the further points A and B are from the
formateur axe.
By proposition 1, the equilibrium share always lies on a vertex (a party ends
up with nothing). Note that the equilibrium share depends on the identity of the
formateur; thus, a priori, zij 6= zji .
Combining the information in table 1 and equation 1 it is possible to compute
the misrepresentation of voters’ preferences under the proportional rule (MPR)
and under majority voting (MMV ).
Equation 1 can be rewritten as:
My =
[(
e1
(1− δ) (1− δe3)
1− δ + δ2e1e3 − c1
)2
+ (2a)(
e2
(1− δ) (1− δe3)
1− δ + δ2e1e3 + e3
(1− δ) δe2
1− δ + δ2e1e3 − c2
)2
+ (2b)(
(e1 + e2) (1− δe2 − δe3) δe3
1− δ + δ2e1e3 +
e3 (1− δ) (1− δe2) + δ2e1e3
1− δ + δ2e1e3 − c3
)2]0.5
(2c)
where 2a, 2b and 2c are the distances, respectively for party 1, 2 and 3, between
29Optimal in the sense that each party obtains a share of the budget equal to the share of
citizens supporting it.
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the expected budget share and the share of voters supporting each party.
Computing misrepresentation under proportional rule is straightforward; seats
and votes shares are the same. Equation (2) becomes
MPR =
1
[1− δ + δ2c1c3]
[
((1 + δ) δc1c3)
2+ (3)
δ2c21 ((δc1 − 1− δ) c3 − 2)2 + (δc2c3 (2 + δc1 − 2δ))2
]0.5
Using the cube rule (assumption 5) to obtain the relation between ci and ei,
equation (2) becomes
MMV =
[[
c33
[
(δ − 1) [(c33 + c32) c33δ + σ2]− δc63 (1 + δ)]− c3σx]2+ (4)[
c32
[
(1− δ)σ2 − 2c63δ2
]− c2σx]2+[
c33
[
c31σδ + 2
(
c31 + c
3
2
)
c33δ
2 + (1− δ)σ2]− c3xσ]2]0.5 1
σx
where σ =
3∑
i=1
c3i and x = (1− δ) σ2 + c31c33δ2.
It is now possible to compute the difference in misrepresentation between the
two electoral systems MM =MPR −MMV :
MM =
1
[1− δ + δ2c1c3]2
[
((1 + δ) δc1c3)
2+ (5)
δ2c21 ((δc1 − 1− δ) c3 − 2)2 + (δc2c3 (2 + δc1 − 2δ))2
]0.5
−
[[
c33
[
(δ − 1) [(c33 + c32) c33δ + σ2]− δc63 (1 + δ)]− c3σx]2+[
c33
[
c31σδ + 2
(
c31 + c
3
2
)
c33δ
2 + (1− δ)σ2]− c3xσ]2]0.5( 1
σx
)2
When equation (5) is positive, plurality rule represents voters’ preferences bet-
ter than the proportional rule (i.e., each party’s expected budget share is closer to
the number of votes the party received). In fact, MM > 0 means that the differ-
ence between parties’ expected and optimal share is greater under the proportional
than the plurality rule.
Proposition 3 (Role of the discount factor) Two thresholds (δ; δ¯) exist for
the discount factor such that, for any combination of seats shares between parties:
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a) majority voting is preferable when δ > δ¯
b) proportional rule is preferable when δ < δ.
When the value of δ is within the two thresholds, the relative share of seats among
parties determines whether the majority voting system is preferable or not. The
two thresholds for δ are (10.8%; 78%).30
Proof. This can be proved either through numerical simulation or graphically.
Figure 4 shows how equation 5 changes, for six levels of δ. The horizontal axe
depicts the share of seats of party 3 (e3), while e2 is given by the depth axe.
Figure 4: The impact of δ
Outside the interval δ ∈ (10.8%; 78%) misrepresentation depends only on δ and
either electoral system is always preferred. On the opposite, within that interval
parties’ relative share of seats also matters.
Proposition 3 can be easily interpreted. After elections a coalition forms: the
formateur lets its partner a share of budget at least equal to the expected share
the partner would otherwise obtain in the next period. When δ is small enough
(parties are impatient), it is cheap to persuade a partner: indeed when δ tends to
zero, the formateur’s share of budget tends to one and parties’ expected utility
tends to their share of seats. Thus, the best electoral system is the one for which
30The value for the two thresholds depends on the number of parties; 10.8% and 78% are
the values for the three-party case. The remaining of the proposition holds even with a larger
number of parties.
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ci = ei, i.e. the proportional one.
31 In other words: filter 2 (picture 1) disappears
for δ going to zero and there is no reason to distort the mechanism at filter-one
level.
The share the formateur has to leave equalises its partner’s discounted expec-
ted earning. When δ gets larger (parties are patient), a distortion appears at
filter-two level since the portion increases of future earnings the formateur has to
leave to its partner; the expected share of small parties becomes larger than the
share of votes they received. The majority voting electoral rule distorts election
results in the opposite direction (reducing the share of seats and of budget of small
parties); when δ is large enough (δ > 78%), the distortion level is large and the
majority rule desirable. When δ ∈ (10.8%; 78%), the discount factor guarantees
that the excessive share of small parties is quite small: the majority rule distortion
then might be too large. When the smaller party is very small the majority rule
distortion is larger than what necessary to balance the coalition formation distor-
tion (i.e., the distortion at filter 1 level induced by plurality rule is too large with
respect to the one at filter 2 level). For δ ∈ (10.8%; 78%) and c3 close to zero the
proportional rule is preferable while, for c3 and c2 big enough, majority voting is
better than proportional rule.
3.1 Relaxing some assumptions
Before moving to next section, I briefly describe how model’s results would change
relaxing some assumptions. The most delicate assumption is probably that the
number of parties is limited to three. This is a simplifying assumption that allows
to obtain some closed form results. It is possible to solve the model with a larger
number of parties but it would be necessary, to have clear results, to impose some
restrictions on the relative share of votes of parties. The first impact of having more
parties comes from the choice of partners. Namely, proposition 2 might not hold,
forming a coalition with the smallest party might not be enough to control the
majority of seats and parties might try to minimise the total size of the coalition
both in terms of represented parties and number of controlled seats. According
to the kind of coalition that is formed, the thresholds for δ would change but
qualitatively results would be the same.
31From an analytical point of view: δ → 0 implies zij → 0, thus zii → 1 and EUi(zSi , t, t) =∑
h∈D pihz
h
i → pii. Since pii = ei, to minimise the difference between the share of votes (ci) and
the expected share of budget for a party (EUi(zSi , t, t)) we need ei = ci, which is the case under
the proportional electoral system.
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Relaxing assumption 1 can lead to two scenarios: if a party obtains the ma-
jority of seats regardless of the electoral system, then any electoral rule is equally
representative of voters’ preferences. Additional, non trivial, researches are re-
quired for the case in which one party controls the majority alone only under a
regime.
When allowing (contrary to assumption 2) coalitions to have different values
(for instance, this would be true if a party has ideological affinities with another),
coalition formation would integrate this. The same considerations as for the num-
ber of parties would hold. I excluded this case, because results would crucially
depend on the hypothesis to model parties’ affinity.
The last consideration is above the common value of δ (assumption 4). What
determines parties’ share is the discount factor of the non-formateur party. All
results can be thus extended just by replacing δ with the discount factor of the
party belonging to the winning coalition other than the formateur.
4 A model illustration with Italian elections’ data
In the introduction I claimed that in Italy, over the two last legislatures, the
smallest parties belonging to the winning coalitions had very much power given
their seats share in Parliament. In this section I use the official results of the
Italian elections to instance the model.32
By the Italian law, Parliament is divided into two houses: the lower house and
the Senate. All adults (older than 18 years old) can vote for the first house, while
only citizens aged more than 25 years old can vote for the Senate (this explains
some minor differences in the number of votes parties receive in the two houses).
The most recent electoral law implies different electoral rules for each house and
includes some regional differences too. Over the 20 Italian regions, in 18 (19 for the
congress) the electoral law is based on the proportional principle, but with local
distortions, possibly different in each region. For my computations, I used the
number of votes a party received and not its number of seats, in order to disregard
the Italian distortions.
In 2006 a centre-left coalition elected Romano Prodi prime minister. Even
though the winning coalition included twelve parties (eight at the senate and
32The official election results are public and can be easily found on the Italian government
website, as well as in the specific web page of each of the two houses of Parliament, on the web
page of the Ministero degli interni and in many independent web pages.
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eight at the lower house), many of these parties were just created ad hoc before
the election to take advantage of some peculiar mechanisms of the non standard
electoral law and only few of them were real independent parties, with an own
agenda (different from the one of the main party in the coalition) and some strong
personalities managing them. In the Senate, the smallest independent party in the
coalition was UDEUR. On a national basis it represented about 1% of citizens.
UDEUR was pivotal and, when in 2008 it decided not to support Mr. Prodi
anymore the government lost the majority and new elections were called.
Coalition members were aware of the consequences of one party leaving. In-
cluding the support given to Mr. Prodi by some “senatori a vita”33, the majority
controlled three more senators than the opposite coalition. During the last months
of Mr. Prodi’s government, the three UDEUR’s senators and a few other senators
in the coalition (e.g. Mr. Dini) used their influence on medias and their pivotal
positions (threatening to leave) to obtain some major changes in several law pro-
posals and especially in the ”Finanziaria”.34 They carried on their own agenda
and clearly showed that their power within the coalition was much higher than the
1% they were supposed to represent.
In what follows, I illustrate my model considering the left and the right co-
alitions as two independent parties (named CL and CR) and UDEUR as a third
independent party that can form a coalition with either coalition.35 The first
column of table 2 summarises the 2006 Italian Senate share of seats under pro-
portional representation. The second column is an estimation (using the “cube
rule”) of the number of seats each party would have obtained with a majoritarian
electoral system.
Seats - Proportional Rule Seats - Plurality Rule
CL 49.5% 49.999%
CR 49.5% 49.999%
UDEUR 1% 0.002%
Table 2: Seats Share - 2006 Italian Senate
The share of budget depends on the discount factor. Picture 5 depicts the
33“Senatori a vita” are senators who are not elected (such as former Republic Presidents).
They sit in Parliament for life.
34The ”Legge Finanziaria” is one of the most important Italian laws, voted every year to
determine the way public budget is used during the forthcoming year.
35This would have been plausible even from the political point of view, since it is a centre
(catholic) party and its chief in the past already accepted to be in some coalitions with some
centre-right parties.
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Figure 5: Budget share depending on δ
equilibrium share of each party for different levels of δ. The violet straight line is
for the majority voting case, while the blue dotted one is for the proportional rule
and the yellow dashed one represents the share of votes each party obtained at
the election. The top picture shows the share for CR, the central one for CL and
the bottom one for UDEUR. As you can notice, with the majority voting system
the share of both CR and CL increases at the expenses of UDEUR. Observe also
that UDEUR’s share can be extremely large under the proportional rule when the
discount factor tends to one (e.g., for δ = 0.99, under proportional representation
its expected share is 33%, while under plurality rule it is 0.02%).
Equation (1) measure the Euclidean distance between the average power of
a party and the optimal one, given voters preferences. The larger its value, the
bigger is the difference between the distribution of power in the government and
the distribution of voters’ preferences.
With data on the 2006 Italian elections, the difference in misrepresentation
(MM , equation 5) is drawn in picture 6 as a function of δ. For δ > 66.7%, the
majority voting rule ensures a better representation of voters, while the opposite
is true for δ < 66.7%.
Similarly to what happened in 2006, after the 2008 elections a coalition has
been formed. Due to a change in the political strategy of the two main parties, only
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Figure 6: Misrepresentation as a function of δ
four parties are now represented in Parliament: PD-IDV (the centre-left party)36,
PDL (the centre-right party), Lega Nord and UDC, the smallest party.37
Seats - Proportional Rule Seats - Plurality Rule
PD-IDV 41.7% 49.8%
PDL 41.5% 49.2%
Lega Nord 10.5% 0.8%
UDC 6.2% 0.2%
Table 3: Seats Share - 2008 Italian Congress
UDC did not obtain enough seats to form a two party coalition (see table
3) and resulted to be a ”dummy player”, that is: regardless of the coalition, its
contribution is always irrelevant, thus it never belongs to a winning coalition.
This time the successful coalition was the centre-right one (PDL with Lega
Nord), and Mr. Berlusconi was elected prime minister. Even though the new
coalition is in power only since a few months, Lega Nord has already proved that it
is not willing to accept the coalition’s decisions without negotiating. PDL already
lost more than once the support of Lega Nord on some law proposals that were
not in line with Lega Nord’s program.
Figure 7 again shows the share of budget of each party, according to the value
of δ for PD (top), PDL (centre) and Lega Nord (bottom). Again, under the
36Before the elections, PD signed a pre-electoral agreement to run with IDV. They agreed on
the program and the candidate prime minister. Because of the electoral rule, they considered it
would have been more convenient to keep the two different party names.
37To be more precise, one more party (SVP) is represented. SVP is a local party from a cross-
border region (close to Austria), where the majority of citizens speaks German. They received,
on a national base, 0.5% of votes. To contribute to the defence of linguistic minorities, they have
a special electoral legislation that allowed this party to obtain 2 seats at Parliament (equivalent
to 0.3%). I did not consider votes to those parties who were not represented in Parliament
because too small.
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Figure 7: Budget share depending on δ
proportional rule the smallest party obtains a share of budget (for δ > 27%)
considerably larger than the share of votes received (e.g., with a share of votes of
10.5% and for δ = 80% the expected share of budget for Lega Nord is 26.8% while
under majority voting the share would be 2.5%).
Considering aggregate data and the level of misrepresentation computed by
equation 5, for this example we obtain the result drawn in picture 8, where we can
see that the threshold for δ is δ = 64.64% and above this threshold the majoritarian
rule is preferable to the proportional one.
Figure 8: Misrepresentation as a function of δ
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4.1 Some comments on the cube rule
Up to now, I assumed the cube rule to hold. The cube rule is an empirically tested
measure. In fact, the real share of seats depends on the distribution of preferences
over districts.38 As previously suggested, it might be that for some countries
τ = 3 is not the best proxy one can use and different values for τ can take into
account for idiosyncratic situations (different electoral system, distribution of voter
preferences...).39
Let’s see what happens to last section’s results when letting both δ and τ
varying. Concerning the two previous examples, in the first case (2006 Senate)
we have two big parties and one very small; in the second case, even the smallest
party is relatively big.
Figure 9: Changes both in δ and τ
38In a country, for instance, with three parties obtaining in each district the following share of
votes (40%, 30%, 30%), with the majority voting rule the first party obtains 100% of seats while
the cube rule would predict a share (54%, 23%, 23%).
39It is hard to forecast (without an empirical study) if for a given country the value of τ should
be greater or smaller than three. As a general rule, we should expect that in a country in which
one big party compete in all districts versus small local parties τ should be larger, while for
countries with very heterogeneous districts, strong local parties and no big national parties the
value of τ should be smaller than three.
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Picture 9 shows how the misrepresentation index changes not only over δ but
also over τ . We can notice that whatever the value for τ , non proportional voting
systems perform better if parties are patient.
Figure 10: Effect of τ for different levels of δ
For low levels of δ we notice that non proportional systems perform better
only when the value of τ is slightly larger than one. This is clearer in picture 10,
where we can see that the peak can be very close to one (each line corresponds
to a different level of δ, lower lines are for lower values of δ). When the smallest
party is very small, the majoritarian rule might distort too much and thus it is
preferable to have a small value for τ (this can be obtained artificially, with a mixed
electoral rule, or it can simply be a consequence of the geographical distribution
of preferences: for instance, it might be that in each district there is only one very
strong party, possibly obtaining the totality of preferences). On the opposite, when
the smallest party obtains a large share of votes, the majority voting distortion is
smaller and it is preferable to have a τ closer to three.
Figure 11: Effect of δ for different levels of τ
22
Picture 11 shows how the level of misrepresentation changes with δ for different
levels of τ . Note that for the value of δ for which proportional and majority voting
rule are equivalent is an increasing function of τ , that is: the smaller the value of
τ , the more we are sure that (regardless of the time discount factor) introducing
some elements of distortion to a proportional system is beneficial. Nevertheless,
when parties are very patient it is better to have τ larger.
5 Conclusions
Electoral systems are always a social compromise balancing different interests.
Each country chooses its voting rules according to political, cultural, historical
and social reasons. Many countries in Europe, for instance Italy, show a preference
towards proportional systems while others countries (e.g. U.K. or U.S.A.) have
chosen a majority voting system.
Most countries have adapted their system according to local needs. My work
has considered only the two basic electoral systems (i.e. purely proportional versus
plurality rule) disregarding all the local specificities.
Proportional electoral rules are costly in term of governability: the number
of represented parties tends to increase both in Parliament and in the winning
coalition. The expected duration of governments falls and the average time to
introduce structural changes increases because of the long negotiation time needed
to find an agreement.
According to supporters of proportional systems, this is the price to pay to
ensure that decisions reflect citizens’ preferences. It is clear that through a pro-
portional system, by definition, Parliament’s composition reflects precisely the
distribution of preferences over the country.
It is generally disregarded that decisions are mainly taken by the government
and that within Parliament decisions are normally taken by the majority of mem-
bers. Coalitions form to support a government and the real power of a party is
determined by his role in the coalition and not by its number of seats in Parlia-
ment. Given the distortion due to negotiation and the importance of bargaining
during the coalition formation stage, it results pointless to measure the degree
of representativeness of Parliament. What really matters is the relation between
voters’ preferences and a party’s power within the government.
My work consisted in showing that when parties are sufficiently patient at
the coalition formation stage, the distortion derived by the negotiation process
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(filter 2) increases small parties’ power. At the election stage (filter 1) plurality
rule distorts Parliament’s representativeness (contrary to the proportional rule)
and the two distortions have opposite sign. If parties are very impatient, filter 2
distortion is negligible and thus a non-distorting electoral system is better, but
when parties are patient enough, the magnitude of distortion increases and it
becomes beneficial to introduce some distortions.
My model shows that the idea that proportional electoral rules induce gov-
ernment to better represent citizens’ preferences (with respect to plurality rules)
is false and a majority voting rule can be preferable from a representativeness
perspective.
The Italian example is instructive: during the 2006-2008 government UDEUR,
a party representing 1% of citizens, had the power to threaten the government,
to obtain the change of many elements in the 2008 ”Finanziaria” law and to de-
termine the government’s fall the 23rd of January 2008. Similarly Lega Nord,
with about 11% of votes at the 2008 elections, during the six first months of the
16th Italian legislature has voted several times against the laws proposed by the
government to which it belongs and obtained some major changes in some very
discussed laws, such as those concerning the justice reform, the immigration laws
and the law on federalism. With a less proportional system (and for instance under
plurality rule), small parties’ role would reduce and more decisions would be taken
by parties representing a larger subset of the population.
This is the end of the paper. I hope you liked it.
Thank you for sending me your comments at:
amedeo.piolatto@gmail.com
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 2
The generic share of budget with three parties is resumed in table 4.40
Formateur
Shares 1 2 3
z1 1− z12 − z13 δ1−δe2 (e1z11 − e3z31) δ1−δe3 (e1z11 − e2z21)
z2
δ
1−δe1 (e2z
2
2 − e3z32) 1− z21 − z23 δ1−δe3 (e1z12 − e2z22)
z3
δ
1−δe1 (e2z
2
3 − e3z33) δ1−δe2 (e1z13 − e3z33) 1− z31 − z32
Table 4: Generic shares with three parties
By solving the system of equations, we can (for each of the eight scenarios)
compute the continuation value for each party. In particular, for the case {1,3},
{2,3} and {3,2}, results are summarised in table 5.
Formateur
Shares 1 2 3
z1
(1−δ)(1−δe3)
1−δ+δ2e1e3 0 0
z2 0
(1−δ)(1−δe3)
1−δ+δ2e1e3
(1−δ)δe2
1−δ+δ2e1e3
z3
(1−δe2−δe3)δe3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
(1−δe2−δe3)δe3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
(1−δ)(1−δe2)+δ2e1e3
1−δ+δ2e1e3
Table 5: Shares at equilibrium
The continuation value depends on the coalition and on the identity of the
formateur. To have a stable equilibrium, each party always chooses to form the
same coalition when it is the formateur. For stability, its choice must be, at every
period of time, the best response to others’ player behaviour and the strategy has
to be always the same. Committing to a given strategy allows parties to modify
their continuation value when they are not formateur.
Within the eight scenarios, we look for Nash simultaneous stable subgame
perfect equilibria in pure strategies (SSPPS). Each player has two possible actions
(consisting in forming a coalition with either of the remaining parties). Comparing
expected payoffs of each party in each situation (through a reduced form game
matrix of payoff), we notice that only scenario ({1, 3}, {2, 3}, {3, 2}) is SSPPS. If
40Note that, according to which coalition is formed, some of the cells in the table take the
value zero.
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for example party 2 always form a coalition {2,3} and party 3 a coalition {3,2},
then for party 1 it is a dominating strategy to form a coalition {1,3}.
To check that this scenario is really an equilibrium, take the generic recognition
probabilities (a, b, c). By definition of continuation value, v∗j = az
1
j +bz
2
j +cz
3
j thus:
v1 =
a(1−δ)(1−δc)
1−δ+δ2ac + 0 + 0
v2 = 0 + b
(1−δ)(1−δc)
1−δ+δ2ac + c
(1−δ)δb
1−δ+δ2ac =
b(1−δ)
1−δ+δ2ac
v3 = (a+ b)
(1−δb−δc)δc
1−δ+δ2ac + c
(1−δ)(1−δb)+δ2ac
1−δ+δ2ac =
(1−δc−δb)c
1−δ+δ2ac
and thus v =
(
a(1−δ)(1−δc)
1−δ+δ2ac ;
b(1−δ)
1−δ+δ2ac ;
(1−δc−δb)c
1−δ+δ2ac
)
.
For a = e1, b = e2, c = e3, and knowing that z
i
j = δvj for i 6= j, we are back to
results in table 5.
We check now that no player wants to deviate: refer to an equilibrium E via
the corresponding formed coalition when a party is formateur ,call E∗ the above
proposed equilibrium (that is ({1, 3}, {2, 3}, {3, 2})). Define then Ei the alternative
candidate equilibrium if party i deviates.
Since we look for stationary pure strategy equilibria, to show that no player
wants to deviate, I show that a) E∗ Â1 E1 = ({1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 2}), b) E∗ Â2 E2 =
({1, 3}, {2, 1}, {3, 2}) and c) E∗ Â3 E3 = ({1, 3}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}).
a) E∗ Â1 E1 iff (v3 | E∗) < (v2 | E1), which means (1−δe2−δe3)e31−δ+δ2e1e3 <
(1−δe2−δe3)e2
1−δ+δ2e1e2 ,
thus e3 (1− δ + δ2e1e2) < e2 (1− δ + δ2e1e3). Since e3 < e2, it is clear that
e3 (1− δ) < e2 (1− δ).
b) E∗ Â2 E2 iff (v3 | E∗) < (v1 | E2), which means (1−δe2−δe3)e31−δ+δ2e1e3 <
(1−δe1−δe3)e1
1−δ+δ2e2e3 .
From 0.5 > e1 > e2 > e3, it is a matter of simple algebra to show that the left
hand side is always smaller than the right hand side.
c) E∗ Â3 E3 iff (v2 | E∗) < (v1 | E3), which means (1−δ)e21−δ+δ2e1e3 <
(1−δ)e1
1−δ+δ2e2e3 .
Result follows directly.
26
References
Amer, R., F. Carreras, and J. M. Gimenez (2002). The modified Banzhaf value
for games with coalition structure: an axiomatic characterization. Mathem-
atical Social Sciences 43, 45–54.
Auriol, E. and R. J. Gary-Bobo (2008). On the optimal number of representat-
ives. In IDEI Working Paper, n. 86.
Austen-Smith, D. and J. Banks (1988). Elections, coalitions, and legislative
outcomes. The American Political Science Review 82 (2), 405–422.
Austen-Smith, D. and J. S. Banks (1990). Stable governments and the alloca-
tions of portfolios. American Political Science Review 84, 891–906.
Axelrod, R. (1970). Conflict of interest: a theory of divergent goals with applic-
ations to politics. Markham.
Bandyopadhyay, S. and M. Oak (2008). Coalition governments in a model of
parliamentary democracy. European Journal of Political Economy 24, 554–
561.
Banks, J. and J. Duggan (2000). A bargaining model of collective choice. Amer-
ican Political Science Review 94, 73–88.
Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2001). Elections, governments, and parliaments
in proportional representation systems. The Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics 116, 933–967.
Baron, D., D. Diermeier, and P. Fong (2007). A dynamic theory of a parliament-
ary democracy. Formerly circulated under the title of ”Policy Dynamics and
Inefficiency in a Parliamentary Democracy with Proportional Representa-
tion”, Research Paper Series No.1960, Stanford Business School.
Baron, D. P. (1989). A noncooperative theory of legislative coalitions. The Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science 33 (4), 1048–1084.
Baron, D. P. (1993). Government formation and endogenous parties. American
Political Science Review 87, 34–47.
Baron, D. P. and J. A. Ferejohn (1989). Bargaining in legislatures. The American
Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181–1206.
Blau, A. (2001). British Elections and Parties Review, vol. 11, Chapter 4: Par-
tisan bias in British general elections, pp. 46–65. Frank Cass.
de Swaan, A. (1973). Coalition Theories and Government Formation. Elsevier.
Diermeier, D., H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo (2007). Bicameralism and government
formation. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2, 227–252.
Diermeier, D. and A. Merlo (2004, March). An empirical investigation of coali-
tional bargaining procedures. Journal of Public Economics 88 (3-4), 783–797.
27
Diermeier, D. and P. v. Roozendaal (1998). The duration of cabinet formation
processes in western multi-party democracies. British Journal of Political
Science 28 (4), 609–626.
Douglas, P. H. (1923). The necessity for proportional representation. Interna-
tional Journal of Ethics 34 (1), 6–26.
Duverger, M. (1954). Political Parties. New York, Wiley.
Gamson, W. (1961). A theory of coalition formation. American Sociological Re-
view 26, 373–382.
Hooghe, M., B. Maddens, and J. Noppe (2006). Why parties adapt: electoral
reform, party finance and party strategy in Belgium. Electoral studies 25,
351–368.
Kalandrakis, T. (2006). Proposal rights and political power. American Journal
of Political Science 50, 441–448.
Kestelman, P. (1999). Quantifying representativity. Voting matters 10.
Laakso, M. and R. Taagepera (1981). Proportional representation and effective
number of parties in Finland. In M. Holler (Ed.), Power, Voting and Voting
Power, pp. 107–120. Physica-Verlag, Wurzburg.
Laver, M. and K. Shepsle (1990). Coalition and cabinet government. American
Political Science Review 84, 873–890.
Leiserson, M. (1968). Factions and coalitions in one-party Japan: an interpret-
ation based on the theory of games. American Political Science Review 62,
70–87.
Marichal, J.-L., I. Kojadinovic, and K. Fujimoto (2007). Axiomatic character-
izations of generalized values. Discrete Appl. Math. 155 (1), 26–43.
Martin, L. W. and R. T. Stevenson (2001). Government formation in parlia-
mentary democracies. American Journal of Political Science 45 (1), 33–50.
Morelli, M. (2004). Party formation and policy outcomes under different elect-
oral systems. Review of Economic Studies 71, 829–853.
Nurmi, H. (1981). The problem of the right distribution of the voting power.
In M. Holler (Ed.), Power, Voting and Voting Power, pp. 203–212. Physica-
Verlag, Wurzburg.
Owen, G. (1977). Values of games with a priori unions. In R. Henn and
O. Moeschlin (Eds.), Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game The-
ory, pp. 76–88. Springer-Verlag.
Owen, G. (1981). Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman index for games with
a priori unions. In M. Holler (Ed.), Power, Voting and Voting Power, pp.
232–238. Physica-Verlag, Wurzburg.
28
Qualter, T. (1968). Seats and votes: an application of the cube law to the
Canadian electoral system. Canadian Journal of Political Science 1, 336–
344.
Riker, W. H. (1962). The theory of political coalitions. Yale University press.
Riker, W. H. (1982). The two-party system and Duverger’s law: an essay on the
history of political science. American Political Science Review 76, 753–766.
Rogowski, R. and M. A. Kayser (2002). Majoritarian electoral systems and
consumer power: price-level evidence from the OECD countries. American
Journal of Political Science 46, 526–539.
Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Economet-
rica 50, 97–109.
Schofield, N. (1981). The relationship between voting and party strenght in an
electoral system. In M. Holler (Ed.), Power, Voting and Voting Power, pp.
121–134. Physica-Verlag, Wurzburg.
Schofield, N. (1986). Existence of a ’structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-
collegial voting rule. Public Choice 51, 267–284.
Sened, I. (1996). A Model of Coalition Formation: Theory and Evidence. The
Journal of Politics 58 (2), 350–372.
Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. Kuhn and A. Tucker
(Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II, pp. 307–317. Princeton
Univ. Press.
Snyder Jr., J. M., M. M. Ting, and S. Ansolabehere (2005). Legislative bargain-
ing under weighted voting. American Economic Review 95 (4), 981–1004.
Taagepera, R. and M. S. Shugart (1989). Seats and votes: the effects and de-
terminants of electoral systems. Yale University Press.
van den Brink, R. and G. van der Laan (2005). A class of consistent share func-
tions for games in coalition structure. Games and Economic Behavior 51,
193–212.
Wiese, H. (2007). Measuring the power of parties within government coalitions.
International Game Theory Review 9, 307–322.
29
